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What FINRA Can Learn from
Major League Baseball
Ben Einbinder*
I. INTRODUCTION
For over 150 years, baseball has captivated Americans and has
cemented its place as the national pastime. 1 When the game was invented in
the early decades of the nineteenth century, it was played “on a strictly
amateur basis.”2 By the mid-1850s, the baseball craze hit the New York
metropolitan area, and professionalism inevitably found its way into the
sport.3
In 1869, the Cincinnati Red Stockings became the first fully
professional baseball club, and the National Association of Base Ball Players
became the sport’s first professional league in 1871.4 In 1875, The National
Association of Base Ball Players became the National League of Baseball
Clubs, the predecessor of today’s National League.5 Since the 1870s,
professional baseball’s rising popularity, combined with the implementation
of free agency and arbitration, has turned the game into a multibillion-dollar
industry.6 Today, Major League Baseball (MLB) consists of thirty teams
made up of over 700 players.7 Over the years, MLB has dealt with its fair
share of employment disputes.

* Ben Einbinder is a J.D. candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. Kevin A. Rings, Baseball Free Agency and Salary Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON D ISP.
RESOL. 243, 244 (1987).
2. See id.
3. BENJAMIN G. RADER, BASEBALL: A H ISTORY OF AMERICA’S GAME 9 (3d ed. 2008).
4. DEAN SULLIVAN, EARLY I NNINGS: A DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF BASEBALL, 1825–1908,
73-87 (1997). The National Association of Base Ball Players lasted from 1871 to 1875. Id. at 8384.
5. See Rings, supra note 1, at 244.
6. See Nancy Kercheval, Major League Baseball Revenue Reaches Record, Attendance Falls,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 1, 2008, 9:13 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=asFEMjfiKA5s.
7. See Complete Baseball Team and Baseball Team Encyclopedias, BASEBALLREFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). There are
30 teams with 25 players on each team. Id.
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The securities industry is no different, and in 1986 the securities
employment arbitration program was established. 8 In the first twelve years
of the program, roughly 3,200 employment awards were issued. 9 In 2007,
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) was established and
assumed control of the dispute resolution programs formerly administered
by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE).10
“[FINRA] is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms
doing business in the United States.”11 FINRA has over 3,000 employees
that oversee nearly 4,500 brokerage firms, about 163,470 branch offices, and
approximately 634,385 registered securities representatives. 12 In the
securities industry in the United States, FINRA administers the largest
dispute resolution forum for investors and registered firms.13
This article analyzes MLB’s final-offer arbitration system (the
arbitration system) and advocates for its adoption in employment disputes in
the finance industry. Part II discusses the history and evolution of the
arbitration system. Part III analyzes the current state of the arbitration
system and Part IV discusses its effects on player salaries and the
implications of those affects on MLB organizations. Part V discusses
criticisms of the arbitration system, while Part VI discusses defenses of the
system. Part VII examines FINRA’s arbitration model for disputes in the
securities industry. Part VIII advocates for the use of final-offer arbitration
to determine the amount of the awards for employment disputes in the
securities industry. Lastly, Part IX discusses the impact of implementing
final-offer arbitration in FINRA employment disputes.
II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION
In 1879, following a dispute over a uniform, Jim O’Rourke decided to
quit the Boston Beaneaters and sign on with the Providence team. 14 In
response, the owners of the major league teams met secretly and devised the

8. David B. Lipsky, Ronald L. Seeber & J. Ryan Lamare, The Arbitration of Employment
Disputes in the Securities Industry: A Study of FINRA Awards, 1986-2008, J. D ISP. RES., Feb.-Apr.
2010, at 54.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA.ORG,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) [hereinafter FINRA].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Rings, supra note 1, at 245.
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“reserve system” to prevent players from “jumping” from team to team. 15
Initially, the reserve system was simply a gentlemen’s agreement between
owners that allowed each owner to produce a list of players that were “offlimits” to the rest of the league. 16 Several years later, the reserve system was
formalized and a “reserve clause” was written into the contracts of all
professional baseball players. 17 Under the reserve system, if a player had a
reserve clause in his contract, he was bound to that team for the duration of
the contract and the succeeding season as well. 18 If the player had a dispute
with his employer, he was unable to seek employment with another team. 19
Many players likened the reserve system to a form of slavery; however, the
system satisfied the owners’ desire to retain players as long as they were of
value to the team, while also maintaining the freedom to release the players
when they had lost their value. 20
The reserve system gave the owners complete leverage over of the
players. The unrest surrounding the reserve system led to three separate
legal challenges, all of which made it to the U.S. Supreme Court. 21 In
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, the reserve clause was challenged by a rival league which
was attempting to lure players away from the National League.22 Justice
Holmes accepted the argument by the National League that the reserve
system was a necessity, and upheld the legality of the system. 23 Justice
Holmes further held that the reserve clause did not violate antitrust laws
because baseball was not a business engaging in interstate commerce. 24

15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 246.
19. See id. The only alternatives available to players were to accept whatever offer was made
by the owner, hope for a trade, or seek employment outside of baseball. Id.
20. See id.
21. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Fed.
Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
22. Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207.
23. See Rings, supra note 1, at 247.
24. Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs. It is true
that in order to attain for these exhibitions the great popularity that they have achieved,
competitions must be arranged between clubs from different cities and States. But the
fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross

335

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2012

3

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4

The second legal challenge to the reserve system came in Toolson v.
New York Yankees.25 In Toolson, Earl Toolson objected to the reserve
system because he was being assigned to different minor league teams
within the Yankees organization and he believed he had a better chance
making a major league roster elsewhere. 26 The Court relied heavily on
Federal Baseball and affirmed baseball’s exemption from the antitrust
laws.27
Following the Toolson decision, the players voted to unionize, leading
to the creation of the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA)
in 1954.28 Although the reserve system remained in place, the MLBPA
began addressing issues like the pension fund, minimum salary, and player
grievances under its first permanent, full-time director, Marvin Miller.29
By 1967, the MLBPA persuaded the owners to form their own labor
relations organization, the Player Relations Committee (PRC), to engage in
collective bargaining with the union. 30 In 1968, the MLBPA and the PRC
created the 1968 Basic Agreement (Agreement), a landmark event in the
history of baseball’s labor relations.31 Among other things, the Agreement
increased the minimum salary by $4,000; whereas, the minimum salary had
only increased $2,000 in the twenty years prior to Marvin Miller’s hiring in
1966.32 The Agreement also created the right to formal grievance arbitration

state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change the
character of the business.
Id.
25. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
26. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
27. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
The present cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold
the legislation applicable. We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant
application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation. Without re-examination
of the underlying issues, the judgments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, supra, so
far as that decision determines that Congress had no intention of including the business of
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.
Id.
28. Daniel C. Glazer, Can’t Anybody Here Run This Game? The Past, Present and Future of
Major League Baseball, 9 SETON H ALL J. SPORT L. 339, 341 (1999).
29. See id. at 343-44.
30. LEE LOWENFISH, THE IMPERFECT D IAMOND: A H ISTORY OF BASEBALL’S LABOR WARS
203 (revised ed. 1991).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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and it created the Uniform Player’s Contract—the standard employment
contract signed by all major league players—which could only be changed
through collective bargaining. 33
The 1970 Basic Agreement reconfigured the arbitration process
requiring a tripartite panel comprised of two partisan members and one
neutral, who acted as the Chairman. 34 The panel was given jurisdiction to
resolve all disputes involving any agreement between “a Player and a Club,”
and its rulings were legally binding on both sides. 35
The final legal challenge to the reserve system came in 1972 in Flood v.
Kuhn.36 Curt Flood had been traded by the St. Louis Cardinals to the
Philadelphia Phillies and he refused to report to the Phillies. 37 Since the
Toolson decision, there had been other forms of sports and entertainment
determined not to be exempt from the antitrust laws;38 however, the Supreme
Court again ruled that baseball was unique and was exempt from the
antitrust laws, affirming the legality of the reserve system. 39
Despite their legal victory in Flood, the owners believed that
congressional intervention was imminent and, as such, were more willing to
compromise on changes to the reserve system in the 1973 Basic
Agreement.40 The most significant concession was final-offer arbitration for
salary disputes of all players with more than two years of major league
service.41 The first salary arbitration hearing took place on February 11,
1974 between pitcher Dick Woodson and the Minnesota Twins. 42

33. Id. The Commissioner decided the grievances. Id. Ultimately, the impartiality was
questioned because the owners paid the Commissioner. Id. See also MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE
DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 97 (1991).
34. Basic
Agreement,
art.
X
(1970),
available
at
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/docs/1970CBA.pdf.
35. Id.
36. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
37. Id. at 265.
38. See Rings, supra note 1, at 249.
39. Flood, 407 U.S. at 285.
40. Glazer, supra note 28, at 351.
41. Daniel R. Marburger, Whatever Happened to the “Good Ol’ Days”?, in STEE-RIKE FOUR!:
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 7, 11 (Daniel R. Marburger ed., 1997). Prior to
implementing final-offer arbitration, the player’s only leverage was to hold out into the season or
retire. Id. Final-offer arbitration allowed the player and the club to submit their best offers to a
neutral arbitrator following an impasse in negotiations. Id. The arbitrator would then decide
between the two offers. Id.
42. Ed Edmonds, A Most Interesting Part of Baseball’s Monetary Structure—Salary
Arbitration in its Thirty-Fifth Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 1 (2009). Woodson won his
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Following the 1973 Agreement, there were several grievances that
would end up changing the game forever. Prior to the 1974 season, Jim
“Catfish” Hunter signed a one-year, $100,000 contract with the Oakland
Athletics.43 Hunter requested that half of the amount be paid as regular
salary and the other half be used to purchase a $50,000 non-taxable annuity
in Hunter’s name.44 However, the club owner, Charles Finley, refused
Hunter’s request because the payment would not be tax-deductible for
Finley until Hunter collected on the annuity. 45 As a result, the MLBPA filed
a grievance on behalf of Hunter claiming that Finley’s refusal to purchase
the annuity voided Hunter’s playing contract.46 In December 1974,
arbitrator Peter Seitz ordered Finley to purchase Hunter’s annuity and
declared Hunter free to contract with any club he wished. 47 Hunter then
signed an unprecedented five-year, $3.75 million contract with the New
York Yankees.48 The result of the arbitration was a revelation among the
other players of their true market value.
In early 1974, Andy Messersmith signed a $90,000, one-year contract
with the Los Angeles Dodgers and had an exceptionally good season. 49 The
following year, Messersmith requested a “no-trade” provision in his contract
but was refused when the Dodgers unilaterally renewed his contract under
Section 10(a) of the Uniform Player’s Contract.50 The MLBPA filed a
grievance on behalf of Messersmith and Montreal Expos pitcher Dave
McNally following the 1975 season, claiming that Section 10(a) only
granted teams a one-year renewable option, after which players were free to
negotiate with other teams. 51 Despite being encouraged to settle by the
arbitration panel, the owners ignored the suggestion and the panel ruled in
favor of Messersmith and McNally. 52 The ruling effectively granted free

hearing when the arbitrator chose his $30,000 offer instead of the Twins’ $23,000 offer. Id.
Woodson was then traded to the New York Yankees where he was sent down to the minor leagues
and never returned to the major leagues. Id. Woodson claimed he was “blackballed” because he
used the arbitration process. Id.
43. See MILLER, supra note 33, at 227.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 228.
46. See id. at 231.
47. See id. at 233.
48. See id. at 237.
49. See id. at 241.
50. Id. Section 10(a) provided, in relevant part: “If prior to the [beginning of the season], the
Player and the Club have not agreed upon the terms of [a] contract, . . . the club shall have the right .
. . to renew this contract for the period of one year on the same terms . . . .” Uniform Player’s
Contract, § 10(a) (1973) (incorporated as an appendix to the 1976 Basic Agreement).
51. See Glazer, supra note 28, at 353-54.
52. See id. at 355.
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agency without a minimum service requirement as a player simply had to
refuse to sign a new contract following the expiration of his previous
contract, play out his option year, and become a free agent at the end of the
season.53
The Messersmith-McNally decision led to immediate changes to the
structuring of the reserve system in the 1976 Basic Agreement. 54 Under the
new system, teams could reserve players with fewer than six years of major
league service.55 After six years of major league service, players became
free agents and were able to participate in a post-season “re-entry draft.”56
Players, however, were limited to bids by up to twelve teams during the
draft.57 Through the use of arbitration, the Messersmith-McNally decision
truly set the stage for exponential growth in player salaries.58
The two decades following the Messersmith-McNally decision were
filled with conflict between the owners and the MLBPA. 59 There were
player strikes in 1981, 1985, and 1994 and an owners’ lockout in 1990.60
The disputes ultimately led to the arbitration structure as it stands today. 61
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT ARBITRATION SYSTEM
The current salary structure in MLB separates players into three groups
depending on major league service. 62 The first group consists of players that
are not yet eligible for arbitration and are bound to one team, similar to the

53. See id. at 356.
54. See id.
55. Basic
Agreement,
art.
XVII(B)
(1976),
available
at
http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/1976CBARotate.pdf.
56. Id. at art. XVII(B), (C).
57. Id.
58. ANDREW S. ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS : A PROBING LOOK I NSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 76 (updated ed. 1994). After fifteen years of free agency, the
average player in 1991 earned forty-seven times the mean annual U.S. income. Id. at 77.
59. See Glazer, supra note 28, at 358.
60. See id. at 358-64.
61. PAUL D ICKSON, THE DICKSON BASEBALL D ICTIONARY 736 (3d ed. 2009).
62. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F)(1) (2007-2011), available at
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf. Major league service is calculated by the number of
days a player is on the major league roster in a given year. Id. A year in the major leagues is
defined as 172 days on the major league roster. Id.
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reserve system prior to the Messersmith-McNally decision.63 These players
are typically paid a salary close to the league minimum. 64
The second group includes all players that have accrued enough service
time to satisfy the requirements to become eligible for arbitration. 65 Players
become arbitration-eligible when they have accrued “a total of three or more
years of Major League service, however accumulated, but with less than six
years of Major League service.”66 A player may also be arbitration-eligible
if he has
[A]t least two but less than three years of Major League service . . . if: (a) he has
accumulated at least 86 days of service during the immediately preceding season; and (b)
he ranks in the top seventeen percent (17%) (rounded to the nearest whole number) in
total service in the class of Players who have at least two but less than three years of
Major League service, however accumulated, but with at least 86 days of service
67
accumulated during the immediately preceding season.

Once a player becomes arbitration-eligible, he is then able to negotiate
his salary with his club. 68 Upon impasse, the player and the club submit
their final offers to an impartial arbitration panel. 69 The arbitration panel
must select one of the two offers submitted and cannot pick an amount inbetween.70 The Basic Agreement sets forth the criteria the panel may
consider when deciding between the offers. 71 The panel’s decision is
63. See Edmonds, supra note 42, at 7.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F)(1) (2007-2011).
67. Id. at art. VI(F)(1). This category of players is commonly known in baseball as the “Super
Twos.” Edmonds, supra note 42, at 7.
68. Edmonds, supra note 42, at 7. The arbitration system is the dispute resolution system that
the MLBPA and the owners agreed to use when the negotiations reach an impasse. Id.
69. See Rings, supra note 1, at 254.
70. See id.
71. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F)(12)(a) (2007-2011). The criteria includes:
[T]he quality of the Player’s contribution to his Club during the past season (including
but not limited to his overall performance, special qualities of leadership and public
appeal), the length and consistency of his career contribution, the record of the Player’s
past compensation, comparative baseball salaries (see paragraph (13) below for
confidential salary data), the existence of any physical or mental defects on the part of the
Player, and the recent performance record of the Club including but not limited to its
League standing and attendance as an indication of public acceptance (subject to the
exclusion stated in subparagraph (b)(i) below).
Id. The panel cannot consider evidence related to the following:
(i) The financial position of the Player and the Club; (ii) Press comments, testimonials or
similar material bearing on the performance of either the Player or the Club, except that
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binding on the player and his club only for the season immediately following
the hearing.72 A player may submit to arbitration up to three times prior to
reaching free agency. 73
The third group includes all players with at least six years of service
who have attained free agent status. 74 Upon the expiration of a free agent’s
contract, a club can offer arbitration to the player.75 If the player accepts the
offer to arbitrate, he is considered a signed player for the next season. 76 If
the player rejects the offer to arbitrate, he then becomes a free agent
classified as either a Type A, Type B, or unranked player depending on the
statistical rubric set forth in the Basic Agreement. 77 The classifications
determine what level of compensation the player’s former club receives as a
result of the player’s election of free agency. 78 Once a player has attained
free agent status, he is able to seek the highest offer on the open market. 79
IV. THE AFFECTS OF THE ARBITRATION SYSTEM IN MLB
Since its inception, the implementation of final-offer arbitration has
substantially affected MLB. When the owners and the MLBPA included
arbitration in the 1973 Basic Agreement, they envisioned a system that

recognized annual Player awards for playing excellence shall not be excluded; (iii) Offers
made by either Player or Club prior to arbitration; (iv) The cost to the parties of their
representatives, attorneys, etc.; (v) Salaries in other sports or occupations.
Id. It should also be noted that the arbitration panel is not allowed to issue a written opinion of their
reasoning behind choosing the offer they chose. Id. at art. VI(F)(5).
72. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F) (2007-2011). A club cannot submit an offer less than 80% of
the player’s previous year’s salary unless the player won a salary arbitration in the immediately
preceding year which increased the player’s prior year’s salary by an excess of 50%. Id. at art.
VI(F)(3)(c)(i)-(ii).
73. Id. at art. VI(F).
74. See Edmonds, supra note 42, at 8.
75. Basic Agreement, art. XX(B) (2007-2011). The same criteria are used from Article VI.
Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Type A players are those who rank in the upper twenty percent of their respective
position group, whereas, Type B players are those who rank in the upper forty percent but not in the
upper twenty percent of their respective position group. Id. All players not considered Type A or
Type B are classified as unranked free agents. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Edmonds, supra note 42, at 8. Inherent in the term “free agent” is the individual
player’s freedom from any team.
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would lead to fewer disputes and more settlements. 80 The parties chose
final-offer arbitration because the high level of risk inherent in the all-ornothing procedure incentivizes parties to negotiate in good faith and settle
prior to a hearing. 81 The theory behind final-offer arbitration is that it
promotes a “convergence” of the two positions in the arbitration as the
parties will make concessions to make their offers more reasonable to the
arbitration panel.82 The two sides are ultimately more likely to bargain in
hopes of reaching an agreement prior to the hearing if they fear that the
arbitrator may view the other side’s offer as more reasonable.83
Statistically, MLB’s arbitration system has accomplished its goals.
Since arbitration was incorporated into the 1973 Basic Agreement, 84.32%
of salary arbitration cases filed settled prior to actually being arbitrated. 84
Only twice has the number of arbitrations heard exceeded 50% of the cases
filed.85 In 2009, more than 97% of the arbitration-eligible players settled
prior to a hearing. 86
Along with an increase in the number of settlements, player salaries
have also increased since the introduction of arbitration. In fact, the average
annual negotiated settlement between 1974 and 1993 resulted in a gain
ranging from 33% to 110% over the previous year’s salary.87 In 1993,
players who prevailed in their arbitration hearings gained a 174% salary
increase, whereas players who “lost” averaged a 54% increase in salary.88
As a result, teams have started negotiating multiyear contracts for highly
talented players to avoid the arbitration process. 89 This allows teams to

80. Thomas J. Hopkins, Arbitration: A Major League Effect on Players’ Salaries, 2 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 301, 306 (1992).
81. Adam Primm, Note, Salary Arbitration Induced Settlement in Major League Baseball: The
New Trend, 17 SPORTS LAW. J. 73, 87 (2010).
82. See id. at 88.
83. Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5 SPORTS
LAW. J. 221, 231 (1998).
84. See Primm, supra note 81, at 92.
85. See id. The only two years were 1974 and 1978. Id.
86. Maury Brown, Detailed Report: 2009 MLB Salary Arbitration by Club, Position, and
More, THE BIZ OF BASEBALL (Feb. 24, 2009, 12:54 PM),
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2982:detailedreport-2009-mlb-salary-arbitration-by-club-position-and-more&catid=66:free-agnecy-andtrades&Itemid=153. Only three of the 111 arbitration-eligible players failed to settle prior to a
hearing. Id.
87. See Conti, supra note 83, at 235.
88. Vittorio Vella, Comment, Swing and a Foul Tip: What Major League Baseball Needs to
Do to Keep Its Small Market Franchises Alive at the Arbitration Plate, 16 SETON HALL J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 317, 326 (2006).
89. See Primm, supra note 81, at 93. In 2009, 15 of the 111 players who filed for arbitration
received multiyear contracts in lieu of the one-year contract that typically results from arbitration.
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negotiate with players before they have reached their full playing potential
and, thus, their full earning potential. 90 However, the arbitration system has
forced teams to bear the risk of declining future performance or injury or
face the potential annual salary increases associated with arbitration.91
V. CRITICISMS OF MLB’ S ARBITRATION SYSTEM
Critics of MLB’s arbitration system tend to focus on the damaging
effects the increase in player salaries has had on the game. 92 First, they note
that final-offer arbitration disproportionately favors player interests.93
Arbitration-eligible players receive an increase in their salaries regardless of
whether or not they prevail in their hearings. 94 In 2009, the average increase
in salary among arbitration-eligible players was 143%.95
Another criticism of the arbitration system is that the differential
between player offers and team offers has widened greatly since the
system’s inception.96 In 1974, player offers were 20% higher than their team
offers.97 In 1993, however, player offers jumped to 63% higher than team
offers.98 The divergence of offers has made the high-risk procedure even
more unpredictable. 99

Benjamin A. Tulis, Final-Offer “Baseball” Arbitration: Contexts, Mechanics & Applications, 20
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85, 91 (2010).
90. See Primm, supra note 81, at 93.
91. See id. at 97. The player also bears the risk that his market value will increase beyond the
value of his multiyear contract as he continues to develop his talent. Id.
92. See generally Vella, supra note 88; Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer
Arbitration, Its Use in Major League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football
Wage and Transfer Disputes, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109 (2009); Bibek Das, Salary Arbitration
and the Effects on Major League Baseball and Baseball Players, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2003); John P. Gillard, Jr., Note, An Analysis of Salary Arbitration in
Baseball: Could a Failure to Change the System be Strike Three for Small-Market Franchises?, 3
SPORTS LAW. J. 125 (1996).
93. See Vella, supra note 88, at 326.
94. See Das, supra note 92, at 57.
95. See Chetwynd, supra note 92, at 132.
96. See Gillard, supra note 92, at 131. Player offers have increased at a much higher rate than
team offers since the implementation of arbitration. Id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 132.
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Final-offer arbitration has also been criticized because of the adversarial
nature of the proceeding. 100 When advocating for their offer, teams are
forced to disclose degrading and detrimental evidence of the player’s
character and conduct to persuade the arbitration panel to accept their
offer.101 Players may feel betrayed following an arbitration hearing,
regardless of the outcome, and may perform below their potential as a
result.102 The detrimental effects to the relationship may cause players to
refuse to re-sign with the team during their free agency years or even request
a trade during the upcoming season. 103
Finally, opponents of the MLB arbitration system have criticized the
system because of the way it has enlarged the disparity between small- and
large-market teams.104 Arbitrators are not able to consider the financial
status of the player or the team when making their decision. 105 Large-market
teams, however, are typically willing to pay higher free agent salaries than
small-market teams, and these salaries are taken into consideration in
arbitration hearings.106 Therefore, MLB’s arbitration system imposes an
economic loss on small-market franchises by forcing them to sign players
for salaries exceeding their value to the team. 107
VI. DEFENSES OF MLB’S ARBITRATION SYSTEM
Proponents of MLB’s arbitration system highlight the fact that
arbitration works quickly and fairly while encouraging “parties to adopt a
realistic, good faith bargaining position.”108 Even opponents to arbitration
cannot deny that the program has encouraged pre-arbitration settlements.
Since 1988, 89.23% of salary arbitration cases have settled prior to a
hearing.109
Supporters of arbitration argue that MLB’s arbitration system should not
be blamed for the increases in player salaries.110 In recent years, the average
See Das, supra note 92, at 58.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Gillard, supra note 92, at 134.
Basic Agreement, art. VI(F) (2007-2011).
See Vella, supra note 88, at 328.
See id.
Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitration in Professional Baseball, 1
SPORTS LAW. J. 183, 204 (1994). The arbitrators must reach a decision no later than twenty-four
hours following the close of the hearing. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F) (2007-2011).
109. See Primm, supra note 81, at 92.
110. Matt Mullarkey, Note, For the Love of the Game: A Historical Analysis and Defense of
Final Offer Arbitration in Major League Baseball, 9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 234, 247 (2010).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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player salary has exceeded the average arbitration award. 111 This suggests
that salary increases should be attributed to a combination of arbitration and
free agency.112 Some commentators suggest that if either free agency or
arbitration had been implemented independently of the other, player salaries
would not have increased as dramatically. 113 Arbitration backers also
attribute the increase in salaries resulting from arbitration to the fact that
players are underpaid during their first three seasons in the major leagues. 114
With respect to the small-market teams, advocates of arbitration argue
that the system actually benefits those teams.115 Arbitration allows smallmarket teams to negotiate multiyear contracts without the threat of losing
their better players to other teams through free agency. 116 Multiyear
contracts allow small-market teams to hold on to a player into his early years
of free agency while paying him less than his free agent market value. 117
Many of the benefits of MLB’s arbitration system are a product of the
system’s final-offer structure. If similar arbitration schemes were utilized in
other industries, like the securities industry, the benefits would likely follow.
VII. OVERVIEW OF THE FINRA EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROGRAM
In the securities industry, Rule 13200 of the Code of Arbitration
Procedure for Industry Disputes requires a dispute to be arbitrated if it
“arises out of the business activities of a ‘member’ or an ‘associated person’
and is between or among members, associated persons, or members and
associated persons.”118 Members are brokers and dealers, and the employees
111. See id. at 248.
112. See Gillard, supra note 92, at 133.
113. See id. Abolishing arbitration would create an increase in the supply of free agent players
each season. Id. According to basic economic principles, an increase in the supply would cause the
market price of free agents to decrease. Id. Implementing arbitration without free agency would
have restricted the open market causing salaries to decrease. Id.
114. See Primm, supra note 81, at 107. A player’s salary during his first year of arbitration
eligibility should be viewed not just as compensation for the upcoming season, but also as the
compensation he should have received during his first three seasons. See Mullarkey, supra note 110,
at 248.
115. See Mullarkey, supra note 110, at 249.
116. See id.
117. See id. Young players have a large incentive to accept a multiyear agreement because of
the day-to-day risks involved with playing baseball. Id. The average MLB career only lasts a little
more than five years. Id.
118. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 54.
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in FINRA employment cases are brokers registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).119 These employees are authorized to
recommend and execute buy-sell orders, known as registered
representatives.120
FINRA arbitrations commence when an employee files an initial
statement of claim with the Director of FINRA Dispute Resolution.121 The
arbitration then proceeds similar to a traditional court proceeding, allowing
the respondent to provide an answer to the claim or file a motion to dismiss
the arbitration.122 Following the initial filings, the parties are able to select
the arbitrators through a process of striking and ranking the arbitrators on
lists generated by a computer system. 123 Once the arbitrators have been
selected, the parties participate in a prehearing conference to set the ground
rules for the case. 124 Unless the parties settle, withdraw, or the case has been
dismissed, the case will then proceed to a hearing. 125 The arbitration panel is
required to provide a written decision and is given full discretionary power
when deciding the arbitration award.126 Following a decision, parties to
FINRA arbitration cases may have the arbitration award vacated under
certain circumstances.127

119. See id.
120. See id.
121. FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR INDUS . DISPUTES R. 13300 (2011). The
FINRA rules require that claims be filed within six years of the occurrence or event giving rise to the
claim. Id. at R. 13206.
122. Id. at R. 13302-14.
123. Id. at R. 13400.
124. Id. at R. 13500. During the prehearing conference, the arbitration panel typically sets
discovery, briefing, deadlines for motions, scheduling for subsequent sessions, and other preliminary
matters. Id.
125. Id. at R. 13600. The parties may also elect a simplified arbitration proceeding if the
arbitration involves a claim under $25,000. Id. at R. 13800. The simplified arbitrations are
administered by a single arbitrator and no hearings are held unless requested by one of the parties.
Id. There is also an expedited procedure for cases involving a claim that an associate failed to pay
money owed on a promissory note. Id. at R. 13806.
126. Id. at R. 13904.
127. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2009). Circumstances include:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) where there
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; (4)
where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id.
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Between 1986 and 2008, the FINRA arbitration cases can be separated
into five categories: (1) cases where employees claimed the employer denied
them compensation allegedly owed; (2) cases where employees claimed the
employer had defamed them in some fashion; (3) cases where employees
claimed they were wrongfully terminated; (4) cases where employees
claimed their employer breached the contract; and (5) cases where
employees made a claim of statutory discrimination against the employer.128
Every case involved the employee presenting the arbitrator with a monetary
figure and the employer taking the position that the arbitrator should not
award the employee any money at all.129
Employees were awarded a monetary amount in 61% of the cases, and
the average award across all cases was nearly $146,000.130 The average,
however, is elevated because there were a handful of large awards given
during this period.131 In fact, one employee was awarded over $27 million in
2001.132 However, this case was an anomaly as the median amount claimed
in FINRA arbitrations was $375,000, and the median amount awarded was
only $1,000.133 Employee awards were greater than 50% of what they
claimed only 20% of the time. 134
The FINRA arbitration process has proven to be time consuming as the
average amount of time between the filing of the claim and the issuance of
an award was about seventeen months. 135
VIII. A CASE FOR FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION IN FINRA EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES
Employment arbitrations in FINRA can logically be split into two
processes: determining liability and determining the amount of the award. 136
128. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 55. The distribution of cases was 28%,
27.4%, 13.5%, 8.4%, and 17.1% respectively. Id. Pursuant to the FINRA rules, however, statutory
employment discrimination claims are not required to be arbitrated. FINRA C ODE OF ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE FOR INDUS. D ISPUTES R. 13201 (2011).
129. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 55.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 57.
135. See id.
136. Interview with Robert A. Uhl, Attorney and Arbitrator, Aidikoff, Uhl & Bakhtiari, in
Beverly Hills, Cal. (Feb. 23, 2011). Mr. Uhl has appeared on Fox News and has been quoted on
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In cases where liability is found, the majority of the time is spent
determining the amount of the award. 137 This article advocates for requiring
the use of final-offer arbitration only to determine the amount of the
award.138
Employment disputes in the securities industry are ripe for the use of
final-offer arbitration for several reasons. First, final-offer arbitration will
incentivize claimants to make more reasonable claims once liability has been
found.139 Between 1986 and 2008, the median amount awarded in FINRA
employment cases was only a quarter of a percent of the amount claimed.140
The high risk nature of final-offer arbitration would force parties to reevaluate what their cases are really worth before submitting their final offers
to the arbitration panel. 141 If a party truly believes he has a strong case, the
process should not affect his offers.
Adopting final-offer arbitration would also increase the rate of
settlement in FINRA employment disputes. 142 By forcing parties to submit
more reasonable offers, the system creates a more realistic bargaining
zone.143 In turn, this would promote more settlements due to the risk
involved with requiring the arbitration panel to select one party’s offer or the
other.144 Again, parties who believe they have a strong case will not be
deterred from presenting their award amount to the arbitration panel. 145
Another major benefit of using final-offer arbitration would be a
decrease in the costs of arbitration.146 While a direct application of the MLB
timetable may not be appropriate,147 as FINRA cases may present more

securities matters by The Wall Street Journal, Registered Representative magazine, MarketWatch,
and other members of the national and local press. Id. Mr. Uhl was also recognized as a 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 Southern California Super Lawyer. Id. The majority of
Mr. Uhl’s experience with FINRA arbitrations is in investor arbitrations. Id.
137. Id.
138. Currently, parties have the choice to settle their case at any time throughout the arbitration
process. FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR I NDUS. D ISPUTES R. 13701 (2011).
Parties can also choose to use final-offer arbitration if both sides are in agreement. Id. at R. 13105.
139. See Rings, supra note 1, at 255 (“The practical effect of this system is that both sides have
incentive to keep the figures they submit within reason. If one proposal is too extreme, the other
wins almost by default.”).
140. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 56.
141. See Primm, supra note 81, at 87.
142. See id. at 91.
143. See id. at 82.
144. In 2009, only 3% of the MLB arbitration cases went to a hearing. Brown, supra note 86.
145. See Primm, supra note 81, at 87.
146. Presumably, less time spent in arbitration will lead to lower costs.
147. Parties in MLB arbitration are required to submit their offers between January 5 and
January 15 of the given year. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F) (2007-2011). The hearings are then
scheduled to be held between February 1 and February 20 with a decision coming within twenty-
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complex claims, the arbitration process would undoubtedly be expedited by
narrowing the arbitration panel’s decision to two offers. 148 Expediting the
process will lead to a reduction in incidental costs and attorneys fees
associated with the arbitration process. 149
The main criticisms of MLB’s final-offer arbitration system are specific
to issues that are unique to MLB. 150 Therefore, the benefits of adopting
mandatory final-offer arbitration in the determination of award amounts
would likely outweigh any potential negative consequences.
IX. THE IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION IN FINRA
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
If FINRA adopted the requirement of using final-offer arbitration for
employment disputes, there would be a significant impact on the current
arbitration system. It is important to understand that adding final-offer
arbitration to the current FINRA arbitration program would not lead to a
sacrifice in justice. This article does not suggest that final-offer arbitration
should be used in the determination of liability. 151 Therefore, employers and
employees will still be entitled to the same level of procedural due process
as the current program.
By limiting the choices for the arbitration panel, the use of final-offer
arbitration in the determination of the award amount will reduce the length
of the arbitration process. As previously stated, the average FINRA
arbitration case took nearly seventeen months from the filing of the claim to
the issuance of an award. 152 If employment arbitration cases resemble
investor cases, in terms of the amount of time used to determine the amount

four hours following the close of the hearing. Id. The maximum amount of time between
submitting offers and receiving a decision is never longer than eight weeks. Id.
148. Although MLB’s exact timetable may not be appropriate, FINRA could impose a similar
time limit once liability has been determined. See supra note 148.
149. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 56. One case cost a party over $700,000 in
attorney’s fees. Id. Not to mention the considerable amount of costs incurred by diverting company
resources away from day to day tasks.
150. See supra Part V. The only criticism that might apply would be the potential for
divergence in offers. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
151. It should be noted that the determination of liability is inherently similar to a final-offer
arbitration structure. The arbitration panel is forced to decide between two choices: liability or no
liability.
152. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 33.
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of the award, adopting final-offer arbitration should result in a significant
reduction in the overall length of the arbitration.
Another probable impact of requiring final-offer arbitration in the
determination of the award amount would be an increase in settlement. The
high-risk nature of final-offer arbitration forces parties to realistically
evaluate their case and present reasonable offers to the arbitration panel. An
increase in realistic offers will ultimately lead to more realistic bargaining
zones. In turn, the combination of a high-risk procedure and realistic
bargaining zones will lead to increased settlement. 153
The most significant impact of requiring final-offer arbitration will be
decreased costs and expenses. The fundamental characteristics of final-offer
arbitration are designed to curtail the length of the arbitration.154 Reducing
the time needed to resolve the dispute will lead to a reduction in the costs of
the arbitrators and a reduction in attorneys’ fees. Additionally, the excess
time and resources being used in arbitration under the current system could
be reallocated to benefit both the employer and the employee involved in the
case.
Overall, requiring final-offer arbitration in FINRA employment disputes
to determine the amount of the award is likely to have a significant, positive
impact on the parties involved.
X. CONCLUSION
For nearly forty years, MLB has used final-offer arbitration to resolve
salary disputes between players and clubs. MLB’s arbitration system has
proven to be both efficient and cost effective. While the current FINRA
arbitration procedure has proven to be a viable alternative to the traditional
litigation process, parties would likely benefit if final-offer arbitration was
required in the determination of the award amount. Implementing final-offer
arbitration will lead to shorter arbitrations, more settlements, and lower
costs, while ensuring justice for those involved.

153. As previously discussed, Major League Baseball has experienced settlement rates over
97% in recent years. Brown, supra note 86.
154. The arbitration panel is limited to two choices.
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